在公司内部治理中行使监督职能的人员的个人独立性问题，最初是在盎格鲁撒克逊公司治理单一结构法律传统中，以克服监督与管理在统一机构（Board）下“自己监督自己”的困境为目的而进行讨论与研究的。但随着时代发展，德国公司法长久以来确立的监督与管理机关人事、职能相分离的“双层模式”中主要以监督董事会对公司的管理为任务的监事会的成员独立性问题也越来越受到立法、理论界和实践的重视。本文主要研究德国上市股份公司内部治理双层结构中监事个人独立性保障的必要性和相关法律规范。全文共分为四章：
第一章，德国公司内部治理“双层结构”要义。首先，对监事个人独立性法律规范产生作用所依赖的基本法律框架加以分析和总结。其中第一节研究监事会与董事会在人事上、职能上相分离的原则确立的主要法律规范，接下来简述德国“双层结构”中重要特征——员工共同决定制度，作为法律上容忍的监事个人利益冲突存在的制度，为本文研究设定了一定的限制。由于共同决定制度最初设计理念是实现社会的满意度，其相关法律规范分散于各个共同决定法案中，并涉及宪法、劳动法的特殊规则，而本文主要从公司法视角出发，因而在下文将不对员工代表在监事会中的独立性问题作特殊讨论，而只关注于股东一方代表监事的独立性。接下来简述“双层结构”主要缺陷——监事会与董事会沟通不畅、对监督对象的信息掌握不足。为克服此缺陷，德国立法者通过《股份法》改革实现了监事会的职能扩张。本章最后概括了德国学者对目前“双层结构”的看法：虽然监事会的职能行使不完善被人长期诟病，但研究证明并不是“双层结构”本身的问题，任何一种模式都有其利弊，且两种主要模式正在彼此“趋同化”发展。因此，学界普遍认为，放弃“双层模式”是没有必要的。
第二章，监事会职能与监事独立性问题。为应对“双层结构”监督缺陷而进行的监事会职能扩张，对监事会成员个人独立性提出了新挑战。首先是历史考察。从 1884 年之前的《德意志普通商法典》到今日受欧盟法影响并被《德国公司治理准则》所补充的《股份法》中确定的双层结构及监事会职能，监事会与董事会的职能划分经历了由模糊到清晰再到彼此融合的一个“否定之否定”的过程。接下来重点考察现行法中监事会的基本职能能——监督与咨询。作为职能扩充的表现，本文以监事会特定事项保留权为例探讨德国现行法中“双层结构”
的界限是否已被突破。最后分析监事会职能扩充，特别是咨询职能的发展给监事个人独立性带来的挑战。得出结论：正是由于监事会职能的扩充，监事个人独立性保障问题在公司治理讨论中尤为重要。
第三章，利益冲突与独立性。由于个案中与制度性的利益冲突的存在，特别是德国监事会成员“兼职”的角色设定，使得监事不能以公司利益为唯一利益导向而进行独立公正的判断。利益冲突与监事的不独立性认定有直接关联。对利益冲突进行规范，是保障监事的个人独立性的重要方式。
第四章，监事独立性保障制度的规范分析。对公司治理实践产生作用的规范主要是立法和作为“软法”的《公司治理准则》。本文对《公司治理准则》作用机制和法律意义作了分析，认为这种方式可有效解决公司治理中公司自治与法律强制之间的矛盾。而其产生作用的具体表现，则结合接下来的《股份法》规范进行分析。
在这一章中，本文着重对第 100 条第 5 款中概念的不确定性，和法律后果确定困难的问题进行研究。并得出结论：法律后果确定困难的问题产生于事物本身的矛盾。对这一问题的解决，目前最有效的方式是通过法院个案认定形成“案例群”以抽象出规则，弥补法律空白带来的法的不安定性。《股份法》第 161 条确立的“遵守或者解释”的机制，结合《公司治理准则》具体条款，通过市场而不是法律强制的方式对公司治理的完善产生作用。
关键词：德国上市公司 双层结构监事会 监事个人独立性 公司治理
ABSTRACTDiscussion on the theme "the independence of the members of thesupervisory board in corporate governance", was hold originally only in theregion following the tradition of Anglo-Saxon law. To remedy the defect"one can?t control itself "in a uniform board, the Anglo-Saxon law hasdeveloped Outside Directors System. With the development, however, inGermany corporation law, that over a long time the two-tier board system–separation between a management board ("Vorstand") and a supervisoryboard ("Aufsichtsrat")- rules, the problem "independence of the membersof the supervisory board" is attracting more and more attention. Thismaster?s dissertation focus on the theme, the necessity of the independenceof the members of the supervisory board in corporate governance inGermany stock exchange-listed companies and relative regulations. Thisdissertation is divided into 4 chapters as follows:
Chapter One studies the crucial factors of the two-tier system. Firstly,it analyzes and summarize the framework, on which the independence ofthe members of the supervisory board in corporate governance relies. Thefirst section discusses on the principle of both personnel and functionalseparation between a management board and a supervisory board. And thendescribe briefly the features of co-determination regime. As a regime, thatreflects the tolerance of conflicts of interests by law, it defined the limit ofmy dissertation. Since the concept of co-determination regime is to realizethe social satisfaction, furthermore, it refers to many other law domainsincluding construction law, labor law, etc. , while meine dissertation composes just in a corporate governance? perspective. Therefore infollowing paragraphs the specific problems related to the representatives ofthe workforce are ignored and only the independence of the representativesof shareholders is discussed.
Then in the next section is revealed the main flaws of the two-tierstructure-lack of communication between management board andsupervisory board,and the supervisory board is not enough informed. Inorder to remedy this defect, Germany lawmakers expand the function ofsupervisory board by means of the reform of the AktG. At the end of thisChapter is summarized the opinions of Germany scholars: although thefunction of supervisory board works inadequately in the practice, thedefects yet doesn't result from the two-tier system itself. Every structure inthe corporate governance has its advantages and disadvantages. In additionto this, both the main structures are converging with each other. Therefore,currently prevailing view in jurisdiction and experts' literature believe it notnecessary to abandon two-tier system.
Chapter Two deals with the function of board of supervisors and theindependence of individual supervisors. The expansion of the function ofboard of supervisors in modern times challenges the independence ofindividual supervisors. The division of the functions of board of directorsand board of supervisors has gone through three stages—blurred, distinct,blended—from before 1884 to the two-tier structure and the functions ofboard of supervisors which are influenced by today’s european laws anddetermin by AktG supplemented by German Corporate Governance Code.
The chapter then explores the basic function of board of supervisorsunder current laws — supervision and consultancy. My dissertationdiscusses that if the boarder of the double-tier structure has been brokenthrough under current German law, based on "agreement reservation for thesupervisory board" an example of the function expansion of board ofsupervisors. Then the chapter analyzes the challenges, faced by individualsupervisors, arising from the expansion of board of supervisors’ function,especially the function of consultancy, and draws the conclusion: it is theexpansion of function of the board that makes the independence ofindividual supervisors an important issue for the discussion of corporate governance.
Chapter Three is concerned with conflicts of interest andindependence. Due to the conflicts of interest between individualsupervisors and the corporation, in particular the “double role” of thesupervisors in Germany, the individual supervisor cannot makeindependent and fair judgments solely in the interest of the company. Theconflicts of interest is directly related to the dependence of a member?saffirmation. To regulate the interest conflicts is an important way to securethe independence of individual supervisors.
Chapter Four analyzes the regulations provided for a system thatsecures the independence of supervisors. Legislation and GermanCorporate Governance Code (as soft law) are the major regulations thathave effect on the practice of corporate governance. The dissertation makesanalysis on the mechanism and legal significance of German CorporateGovernance Code, and finds that German Corporate Governance Code caneffectively resolve the contradiction between corporate self-governance andmandatory law. Details of the effectiveness of German CorporateGovernance Code is analyzed together with the stipulations of AktG.
This Chapter focuses on the ambiguity of the definition in Item 5 ofArticle 100, and the difficulty in deciding the legal result, and draws theconclusion that the problem in deciding the legal result derives from thenature of things. To resolve this problem, the most effective methodcurrently is to abstract rules from a group of cases ruled by court. The“comply or explain”system set forth in Article 161 of AktG, combinedwith the stipulations of German Corporate Governance Code, improvescorporate governance through market mechanism, rather than mandatoryprovisions of law. At the end of this chapter, advice is provided for thecorporate governance reform of China, based on the study on thesupervisor independence in Germany.
Keywords：Germany stock exchange-listed companies, two-tier systemsupervisory board, the independence of the members of the supervisoryboard, corporate governance.
目 录
引言
第一章 德国公司内部治理“双层结构”要义
第一节 “双层结构”核心特征
一、监督机关与管理机关人事、职能双重分离
二、共同决定制度
第二节 “双层结构”的缺陷与对策
第三节 德国学者对“双层结构”的基本态度
第二章 监事会职能与监事独立性问题
第一节 德国监事会职能的历史沿革
第二节 德国现行法中的监事会职能
一、咨询职能
二、特定事项同意保留权
第三节 监事会多种职能并存与监事个人独立性的关系
第三章 利益冲突与独立性
一、法律为利益冲突设定的框架
二、针对利益冲突的对策
第四章 监事独立性保障制度的规范分析
第一节 《公司治理准则》简析
一、《准则》产生的背景
二、《准则》的法律性质
三、欧盟在公司治理准则一体化方面的努力
第二节 《股份法》中确保监事独立性的规范分析
一、兼任禁止
二、轮岗的限制
三、“等待期”规定
四、第 114 条“公司与其监事签订合同需得到的监事会的同意”
五、股东对监事选举影响的禁止
六、监事会选举中的候选人信息公制度
七、独立监事条款
八、《准则》关于监事会及其成员独立性要求的补充建议
结论
参考文献
